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We construct quarterly series of the revenues, expenditures, and debt outstanding for Japan from 1980
to 2010, and analyze the sustainability of the fiscal policy.  We pursue three approaches to examine
the sustainability.  First, we calculate the minimum tax rate that stabilizes the debt to GDP ratio given
the future government expenditures.  Using 2010 as the base year, we find that the government revenue
to GDP ratio must rise permanently to 40%-47% (from the current 33%) to stabilize the debt to GDP
ratio.  Second, we estimate the response of the primary surplus when the debt to GDP ratio increases.
We allow the relationship to fluctuate between two “regimes” using a Markov switching model.  In
both regimes, the primary surplus to GDP ratio fails to respond positively to debt, which suggests
the process is explosive.  Finally, we estimate a fiscal policy function and a monetary policy function
with Markov switching.  We find that the fiscal policy is “active” (the tax revenues do not rise when
the debt increases) and the monetary policy is “passive” (the interest rate does not react to the inflation
rate sufficiently) in both regimes.  These results suggest that the current fiscal situation for the Japanese
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1.  Introduction 
Mounting government debt is a serious issue in many countries in Europe, the U.S., and Japan.  
The concern on sustainability of increasing government debt already put Greece into a serious 
crisis, and other European countries had to bail out Greece twice already (May 2010 and July 
2011) in concert with the IMF.  Ireland (November 2010) and Portugal (April 2011) followed 
suit.  Increasing debt and slow economic growth has increased the cost of financing for other 
troubled economies such as Spain and Italy.  The fiscal problem for the U.S. looked less pressing, 
but the political gridlock and the inability to come up with a credible plan to put the government 
finance in order drove the U.S. dangerously close to default this month (August 2011).  Although 
the worst case scenario of the outright default was avoided at the last minute, the U.S. politicians 
still face a difficult task of building a consensus on how the burden of deficit reduction should be 
shared. 
  Japan also suffers from a serious problem of the government debt.  Indeed Japan’s 
problem seems more serious when we look at the (gross) debt to GDP ratio.  The OECD figure 
for 2010 shows that Japan’s debt to GDP ratio was 198%, which is much higher than the U.S. 
(93%), the U.K. (81%), France (92%), Germany (80%), and even Greece (129%).   
  Japan’s debt is a result of continued deficits of many more years than the U.S. or Europe.  
The start of the increasing government debt goes back to the fiscal stimulus packages in the early 
1990s, when the Japanese economy suffered from the collapse of asset prices.  There have been a 
couple of attempts of fiscal consolidation, but neither of them lasted long enough to achieve the 
initial goals, and the debt has continued to increase. 
  This paper examines the sustainability of Japan’s fiscal policy.  There are two 
contributions that the paper makes to the discussion of fiscal sustainability for Japan.  First, the 4 
 
paper presents reliable quarterly data for the budget deficit and the government debt of Japan 
from 1980 to 2009.  The data are comprehensive in that the coverage includes both central and 
local governments and almost all the government accounts including the social security fund.  
We also create the data series for only the central/local governments, excluding the social 
security account. 
  Second, the paper takes three complementary approaches to examine the sustainability.  
The first approach is that of Broda and Weinstein (2005) and Doi (2009).  Here the question is 
how much the government needs to raise the tax revenue to stabilize the debt to income ratio in 
the long run given the future government expenditures and transfers.  The second approach is an 
extension of Bohn (1998), and considers the dynamic feedback from the level of government 
debt to future government surpluses.  The third approach considers the responses of tax revenues 
to the level of debt as well as the fluctuations in the government expenditures, following Davig 
and Leeper (2007). 
  The paper is organized as follows.  In the next section, we briefly trace the evolution of 
the Japan’s government debt over the last 20 years.  Section 3 explains how we construct the 
quarterly data series of budget deficit and government debt that we use for the empirical analysis.  
In Section 4, we update the analyses of Broda and Weinstein (2005) and Doi (2009), and 
calculate the minimum tax rate that Japan needs to stabilize the debt to GDP ratio.  Section 5 
estimates a feedback rule from the level of government debt to the primary surplus à la Bohn 
(1998) to see if we observe stabilizing response of fiscal surpluses as the government debt 
increases in Japan.  We consider the possibility that such a feedback rule has fluctuated between 
two different regimes over time.  Section 6 estimates the fiscal policy function that models the 
tax revenues as a function of the government debt, output gap, and the government expenditure.  5 
 
The model allows two regimes with different responses of the government revenues.  We also 
estimate a monetary policy function that is also state contingent, and discuss the interactions 
between the fiscal policy regimes and the monetary policy regimes.  Section 7 concludes. 
 
2.  Accumulation of Government Debt in Japan: 1991-2010 
In the fiscal year 1990, the Japanese government believed that it had succeeded in 
containing the budget deficit problem that plagued them since the late 1970s, but it did not last 
long.  To fight the recession following the collapse of asset price boom, the government turned to 
a series of fiscal stimulus during the first half of 1990s.
1  Figure 1 shows the deficit to GDP ratio 
and the debt to GDP ratio for the 1990s and the 2000s.  The numbers are for the government 
sector as a whole, which includes the central as well as local governments and the social security 
funds.  The numbers for 2010 and 2011 are for the initial budgets. 
The figure shows that the government continued to run budget deficit throughout the last 
two decades.  There have been some episodes when the budget deficit declined in proportion to 
GDP when the economy recovered and/or the government tried to reduce the deficits (1996, 
2000, 2005-2007).  The deficit to GDP ratio, however, increased from 2.5% in 1993 to about 8% 
by the end of the 1990s and most of the 2000s.  Reflecting this trend in the deficits, the debt to 
GDP ratio steadily increased from 74% to 200% by the end of 2000s. 
Figure 2 shows the budget surplus of eight OECD countries (G7 plus Greece) as % of 
GDP.  Note a negative number means budget deficit.  From 1997 to 2005, Japan’s budget deficit 
to GDP ratio was the largest among G7 countries and even higher than that of Greece most of the 
time. 
                                                           
1 Doi and Ihori (2009, pp.24-31) summarizes major developments of Japanese fiscal policy from 1981 to 2007. 6 
 
The gross debt to GDP ratios for the eight countries are shown in Figure 3.  From 1999 
on, Japan has the highest debt to GDP ratio among these countries.  The ratio exceeded 200% 
after 2010.  In terms of net debt, which subtracts the financial assets that the government sector 
owns from the gross debt, Japan looks slightly better.  The Japanese government sector owns 
substantial financial assets (most notably in the social security funds), some of which are 
invested in the Japanese government bonds.  For example, as of March 2009, the social security 
funds (reserves for government-run pension systems) had the net financial assets of about 200 
trillion yen (about 40% of GDP). Figure 4 shows the net debt to GDP ratios for the eight 
countries.  Even with this measure, however, the Japan’s debt to GDP ratio has been the highest 
since 2008.  The net debt to GDP ratio stood around 120% for Japan in 2010.  
The Japanese government debt has been rising very rapidly.  It is obvious that the debt to 
GDP ratio cannot continue growing forever.  At one point, the debt to GDP must be stabilized 
(unless the Japanese government declares defaults).  What are the conditions to stabilize the debt 
to GDP ratio at a certain level in the future?  How much longer would the debt to GDP ratio 
continue rising before it starts to decline?  How is such a policy change likely to happen in Japan 
given its past fiscal policy regimes?  These are the questions that we ask in this paper. 
 
3.  Data Construction 
The fiscal data used in the econometric analysis in Sections 5 and 6 are constructed from 
the national income accounting published by the Cabinet Office of the Japanese government.  
We create quarterly time series from the first quarter of 1980 to the first quarter of 2010 for 
government expenditure, revenue, primary deficit, and debt for two alternative definitions of the 
government sector: the central/local governments and the general government sector that also 7 
 
includes the social security funds.  The data set is available as the electronic appendix for this 
working paper.  It is also available for download at 
http://web.econ.keio.ac.jp/staff/tdoi/DHOdata.html. 
  The total expenditure and revenue series for the general government are readily available 
in the national income accounting at quarterly frequency with a couple of exceptions.  For the 
capital transfers and net purchases of land, the data are available only at annual frequency.  We 
can use, however, two types of annual series: calendar years and fiscal years.  For the initial year 
(1980), we create the quarterly numbers by dividing the amount for the calendar year by four.  
Then, we calculate the first quarter number for the second year by subtracting the sum of the last 
three quarters of the first year from the fiscal year number for the first year.  Subtracting the first 
quarter number from the calendar year number for the second year, we can calculate the number 
for the last three quarters.  Iterating this process, we can estimate the first quarter number and the 
total of the last three quarters for every year.  Finally, the number for the last three quarters each 
year is divided into individual quarterly numbers, taking into account the trend increase observed 
in the first quarter numbers.
2   
  The revenues and expenditures by subsector are available only annually, so we construct 
the quarterly data in the following way.  For most items, we first estimate the quarterly amount 
for the social security funds sector, and the numbers for the central/local governments sector are 
obtained by subtracting the numbers for the social security account.  The exceptions are transfers 
                                                           
2  Let Yt be the amount for the fiscal year t and Xit be the estimated amount for the i-th quarter of year t; i.e., Yt = X2t 
+ X3t + X4t + X1t+1.  We estimate the amounts for the second, third, and fourth quarter of each year from  the total 


























































within the general government sector.  For those series, data on the central/local governments 
side are publicly available, so we calculate the quarterly amount for the central/local 
governments first and then subtract the number from the general government sector number to 
obtain the amount for the social security sector.  Table 1 shows how each relevant item in the 
national income accounts is estimated for each subsector. 
  Some expenditure or revenue items apply only to the central and local governments.  For 
example, many tax revenue items, including income tax revenue and value added tax revenue, 
accrue only to the central and local governments.  For those items, we can safely assume the 
amount for the social security funds is always zero.  Some other items such as social security 
contributions apply only to the social security funds.  For those items, we just take the quarterly 
amount for the entire general government sector as the amount for the social security funds.  For 
the other items, we estimate the quarterly amounts for social security account by prorating the 
annual numbers.  The expenditures and revenues related to financial transactions other than the 
interest payment, such as dividends received, rents paid and purchases of land, are estimated by 
dividing the annual amounts by four.  The other items including the interest payment, the final 
consumption, the fixed capital formation, the current transfers are calculated so that the 
proportion of the social security account (in the general government sector) at each quarter is the 
same as the proportion of annual flows for the fiscal year.   
  For the transfers within the general government sector, we first use Ministey of Finance 
“Financial Statistics Monthly” and Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications “White 
Paper on Local Public Finance” to estimate the amount for the local/central governments sector.  
Then, we calculate the number for the social security sector by subtracting the number for the 
local/central government sector from the number for the general government sector. 9 
 
  We also adjust for temporary fluctuations caused by known unusual events that happened 
in each account.
3  Such special transfers between public corporation and the government are 
excluded from government expenditures and revenues series. 
  The debt outstanding series in the national income accounting is available only in annual 
frequency, too.  Again we estimate the quarterly series using both calendar year series and fiscal 
year series.  Since the debt outstanding is a stock data, the amount at the end of the fourth quarter 
is the same as the amount at the end of the calendar year, and the amount at the end of the first 
quarter is the same as the amount at the end of the previous fiscal year. For the periods before 
1998, we estimate the second quarter and third quarter numbers by linearly interpolating the 
series.  For the periods after 1998, we use the Bank of Japan Flow of Funds data to match the 
seasonal pattern of the debt outstanding series for each sector to the seasonal pattern of the 
corresponding data in the flow of funds statistics.
4   
  We construct the budget surplus (called net lending / net borrowing in the official SNA 
statistics) and primary surplus at quarterly frequency from the revenues and expenditures series. 
The budget surplus (or deficit) number is generally not equal to the increase in the net 
government asset (or debt), because the latter includes the capital gains (and losses) and other 
                                                           
3 These include transfers of liabilities from the Japanese National Railways Settlement Corporation and the Special 
Account for National Forest Service to the general account of the central government in 1998, returns of the public 
part of pension reserves from employee pension funds to the Welfare Insurances Special Account of the central 
government (so-called daikō henjō) for years from 2003 onward, transfers of assets and liabilities from the former 
Japan Highway Public Corporation and other three highway-related public corporations to the Japan Expressway 
Holding and Debt Repayment Agency, which took place in the privatization of these public corporations in 2005, 
transfers of funds from the Special Account for Fiscal Loan Program Funds to the Special Account for Government 
Bonds Consolidation Fund, which are based on the special law on issues of government bonds in 2006, transfers of 
funds from the Special Account  for Fiscal Investment and Loan Program to the Special Account for Government 
Bonds Consolidation Fund and the General Account, which are based on the act on Special Accounts, and the 
special law on the issues of transfers of funds from the Special Account for Fiscal Investment and Loan Program in 
2008. 
4 The BOJ Flow of Funds data for debt outstanding by subsector are not available for periods before the fourth 
quarter of 1997.  The numbers reported in the System of National Accounting (SNA) and those in the flow of funds 
statistics, however, do not match, perhaps reflecting different treatments of capital gains. 10 
 
changes in the value of government assets and liabilities.  So we define reconciliation term as 
follows: 
  Net debt at the end of this year = net debt at the end of previous year 
        – “net lending /net borrowing” 
        + special factor term + reconciliation term 
  As the measure of debt for our analysis, we used the “adjusted net debt” proposed by Doi 
(2008), which is defined as the gross debt of the government sector minus the financial assets 
owned by the government sector that are readily disposable.  This differs from the standard 
definition of the net debt in that some financial assets at the central and local governments such 
as the fiscal adjustment funds of the local governments are not subtracted from the gross debt.  
These financial assets are held as a buffer for unexpected losses and not expected to be drawn 
down to redeem the debt. 
  Figure 5 shows gross debt, net debt, and adjusted net debt as percentage of GDP for the 
general government sector.  To remove the seasonality, the figure shows the four quarters 
moving averages.  The time series patterns of the series are quite similar.  The adjusted net debt 
that we use for the empirical analysis is closer to the net debt than to the gross debt in its level.  
The adjusted net debt to GDP ratio for the general government sector rose rapidly starting in the 
mid 1990s and reached almost 150% by 2010. 
  Similarly, the debt to GDP ratio series for the central/local governments is shown in 
Figure 6.  Note that the gross debt for the central/local governments is exactly the same as the 
gross debt for the general government as a whole, because the social security account so far 
holds net assets.  The adjusted net debt series is also very close to the gross debt, suggesting most 
of the difference between the gross debt and the adjusted net debt in Figure 5 comes from the 11 
 
social security funds.  The adjusted net debt to GDP ratio for the central/local governments also 
started to rise sharply in the mid 1990s and reached around 180% by 2010. 
  Figure 7 shows expenditure and revenue as percentage of GDP for the general 
government sector.  The seasonality has been removed by taking four quarters moving average 
again.  The expenditure here does not include the interest payment, so that the difference 
between two series shows the primary balance.  For the general government sector that includes 
the social security funds, the primary balance was in surplus in the late 1980s and the early 1990s.  
After the mid 1990s, however, the primary balance has been in red consistently. 
  The expenditure and revenue series for the central/local governments are shown in Figure 
8.  The time series patterns for both series look quite similar to those in Figure 7.  After the mid-
1990s, the primary balance has been in red consistently.  
 
4.  Minimum Tax Rate for Sustainable Fiscal Policy 
This section calculates the minimum amount of taxes (in proportion to GDP) that makes 
the fiscal policy sustainable at a certain future date, given the future paths for government 
expenditures, following the method used by Broda and Weinstein (2005) and Doi (2008, 2009).  
This approach defines the sustainable fiscal policy to be the one that stabilize the debt to GDP 
ratio at the level in the base year, as proposed in Blanchard et al (1990). We start from a basic 
inter-temporal budget constraint for the government: 
  11 tt t t t B BG T i B        (1) 
where Bt stands for the amount of government debt outstanding at the end of period t, Gt and Tt 
are the government expenditure (including transfers) and the tax revenues respectively during the 12 
 
period t, and i is the interest rate that is assumed to be constant.  Dividing the both side of the 




























  (3) 
where bt, gt, and τt denote the government debt, the government expenditure, and the tax 
revenues respectively divided by GDP, and η is the growth rate of GDP, which is also assumed 
to be constant.  We assume  i   .  If the long-run growth rate of GDP exceeded the long-run 
interest rate, sustainability of fiscal policy would not be an issue. 
Rearranging the terms, we can express the debt to GDP ratio as a function of the future 
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             (5) 
The current debt to GDP ratio must be equal to the present discount value of the future debt to 
GDP ratio and the series of future primary surpluses. 
The sustainability requires that the debt to GDP ratio at some distant future n comes back 
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Broda and Weinstein (2005) calculated the number for Japan under some alternative 
scenarios.  Looking at the formula, we see that the tax rate necessary to make the fiscal policy 
sustainable is high when (1) the initial debt to GDP ratio is high, (2) the levels of future 
government spending are high, (3) the interest rate is high, and (4) the growth rate is low. 
Taking the fiscal year 2003 as the base year, Broda and Weinstein (2005) find that the 
Japan needs to raise the tax revenues to around 35% of GDP if the government expenditure is to 
grow at the rate of GDP, and to around 40% of GDP if the government expenditure is to grow at 
the rate of GDP per workers, in order to stabilize the net debt to GDP ratio.  These numbers were 
compared to the tax rate of around 27%, the actual number for Japan in 2003 (including the 
social security contributions).  The numbers required for sustainability are high but not extremely 
high, compared with the tax rates in other advanced economies.  For example, the 35% number 
is comparable to the U.S. tax rate (including the social security contributions).  The higher 40% 
number, which is required to sustain more generous government expenditures in the future, is 
comparable to many countries in EU. 
Thus, the calculation led Broda and Weinstein (2005) to conclude that the fiscal situation 
in Japan is not as dire as some observers claimed.  It is important to note, however, that the 
Japanese government debt increased further since the time they did this calculation.  Doi (2009) 
performed a similar calculation using fiscal 2008 as the base year.  He finds that the tax rate that 
makes the fiscal policy sustainable tends to be higher than those estimated by Broda and 
Weinstein.  For example, if the government expenditure grows at the rate of GDP, the necessary 
tax rate is about 40% even under the scenarios with less generous government transfers.  Thus, 
Doi finds that the sustaining fiscal policy became substantially difficult after five years. Japan 14 
 
needs to increase the tax rate to the levels comparable to many countries in EU just to sustain 
less generous growth in government expenditures. 
In Doi (2009), a new population projection in December 2006 presented by the National 
Institute of Population and Social Security Research is used (Broda and Weinstein (2005) use the 
2002 projection).  In the 2006 projection, the fertility rate forecast for 2050 was lowered to about 
1.2 from the 2002 projection value of 1.39.  The revision reflects a growing tendency among 
Japanese women to get married and give birth later in life and increasing divorce rate.  The 
average age for Japanese women to give birth to the first child was 29.1 years old in 2005, up 
from 27.5 years old in 1995, according to the Ministry of Health, Welfare and Labor (hereafter 
MHWL) statistics.  Japan's falling fertility rate has made it one of the world's most rapidly aging 
countries, with 20.7 percent of the population aged 65 or older in 2006.  According to the latest 
census data, the country's population peaked in 2004 at 127.790 million.  The population fell by 
22,000 in 2005. 
After the publication of Broda and Weinstein (2005), newer sets of estimates of some 
future government expenditures became available.  Thus, Doi (2009) used those, rather than 
assuming the expenditures grows at the rate of GDP (or GDP per worker) for those expenditures 
and transfers. 
For the public expenditures on medical and long term care, the 2008 estimates published 
by the National Congress on Social Security known as the “simulation” were used.  Because the 
study disclosed the detailed inputs for the simulation (unusually transparent for a study done by a 
Japanese government organization), one could tweak the numbers as one sees fit.  The cost on 
medical and long term care reported in the “simulation” includes the co-pay of the people who 
receive the service.  To conform to the national income accounting framework, the future 15 
 
estimates of co-pay burdens are subtracted from the projected costs to obtain the future stream of 
medical and long term care burdens for the public sector.   
The “simulation” considers several alternative scenarios for the future reforms of the 
national healthcare and long term care system.  Scenario A assumes that the current system will 
continue without any reforms.  Scenario B assumes some reforms to address rapidly increasing 
demand for healthcare and long-term care, and includes some sub-scenarios with different levels 
of generosity of the reform.  In this paper, we focus on Scenario B1 with the least generous 
benefits stream and Scenario B3 which is the most generous. 
For the public pension related expenditures, the 2009 pension prediction released by the 
MHLW in February 2009 is used.  The prediction provides the forecasts for the future social 
security expenditures every five years.  The basic inputs for the simulation are carefully 
documented and published, so one can modify those to fit the purposes of the analysis.  Both the 
“simulation” and the pension prediction report different forecasts based on different 
macroeconomic assumptions.  We take the baseline case, which assumes the nominal growth rate 
of 2.0%, the nominal rate of return of the pension system of 4.1%, and the inflation rate of 1.0%. 
The government expenditure items other than healthcare, long-term care and pension 
related ones are assumed to increase at the growth rate of GDP per worker.  
In this section, we extend the analysis of Doi (2009) using 2010 as the base year.  The 
initial adjusted net government debt to GDP ratio is 152.8 percent.  In Doi (2009), the adjusted 
net government debt to GDP ratio at the end of 2010 is estimated to be 144.0 percent.  Thus, the 
deficit situation has already worsened substantially over the past year. 
Following Doi (2009), we consider three different cases, which differ in the scenario for 
the healthcare and long-term care reform.  Case 1 assumes no reforms (Scenario A).  Cases 2 and 16 
 
3 assume the least generous reform (Scenario B1) and the most generous reform (Scenario B3) 
respectively.  Figure 9 shows the forecasts for the future government expenditures for each case. 
The ratio of the government expenditures to GDP never exceeds 40 percent in every case. This 
shows that the government projections for social security benefits and healthcare and long-term 
care expenses imply that those expenditures will be somehow contained even without additional 
reforms for healthcare and long-term care.   
Table 2 shows the tax rate (τ*) that is necessary to reduce the debt to GDP ratio in 2105 
back to the level of 2010.  The calculation is based on equation (6).  For the length of horizon (n), 
we consider two cases: 95 years and 38 years.  The 95 years horizon is roughly the same as the 
longer horizon considered by Broda and Weinstein (2005) (98 years) and the horizon considered 
by Doi (2009) (90 years).  The 38 years horizon is exactly the same as the shorter horizon 
considered by Broda and Weinstein (2005).  Panel A reports the results for the 95 years horizon 
and Panel B reports the results for the 38 years horizon. 
Panel A shows that the tax rates that are necessary to stabilize the debt to GDP ratio in 
about 100 years are higher than those in Broda and Weinstein (2005) or Doi (2009) for similar 
assumptions on the growth rate and the interest rate.  For example, if we assume the interest rate 
is higher than the growth rate by 2% and no further reform on the national healthcare and long-
term care systems (Case 1), the tax revenue to GDP ratio must be raised to 44.1% immediately to 
achieve the sustainability.  The ratio of the government revenues to GDP is forecasted to be 
32.9% for 2010 (OECD Economic Outlook).  Thus, our calculation suggests that the government 
increase the revenues by more than 11 percent of GDP through tax increases and increases in 
social security contributions by taxpayers.   Panel B shows that the sustainable tax rates for the 
38 years horizon in our Cases 1, 2, and 3 are only slightly higher than those for the 95 years 17 
 
horizon.  This suggests that taking a longer horizon and spreading the cost over many 
generations would not reduce the tax burden of each generation very much.
5 
  Figure 10 shows the path of the primary balance for each case.  The figure shows that the 
primary balance of two to four percent of GDP has to be maintained for years.  The primary 
balance reaches close to 10% of GDP toward the end.  Even in the booming 1980s, Japan did not 
experience primary surplus continuing for a decade.  Although such magnitude of primary 
surplus is possible, it is hard to imagine that voters would accept such sustained fiscal austerity 
without resistance.  
Even with the extremely high tax rates, the debt to GDP ratio is forecasted to rise 
substantially before it starts to come down.  Figure 11 shows the implied path for the adjusted net 
debt to GDP ratio for each case.  In all the cases that we consider, the debt to GDP ratio goes 
higher than 200 percent before it comes down.  Noting that the total financial assets of the 
household sector currently amount to about 300 percent of GDP, the government may face 
substantial trouble refinancing the debt somewhere along this path. 
Thus, the optimistic picture painted by Broda and Weinstein (2005) completely 
disappears when we update the analysis using more recent data.  Fiscal expansion after the global 
financial crisis substantially worsened the conditions.  To stabilize the debt by increasing the tax 
rate, the Japanese government would have to raise the revenue by 11% of GDP or more. 
                                                           
5 We also tried the calculation with simpler assumptions about the future government expenditures and transfers 
following Broda and Weinstein (2005).  We considered their Case 2 where the government expenditure and transfer 
per person are expected to grow at the rate of GDP and their Case 3 where the government expenditure and transfer 
per person are expected to grow at the rate of GDP per worker.  It turns out these scenarios provide more extreme 
versions of the future government expenditures and transfers than the scenarios that we consider.  In their Case 2, the 
government expenditures to GDP ratio eventually start to decline more rapidly than any of our cases.  In their Case 3, 
the government expenditures to GDP ratio continues to grow indefinitely.  In either case, the qualitative result does 
not change.  The tax rate that achieves sustainability is higher than that calculated by Broda and Weinstein (2005).  
For their Case 3, for example, a tax rate higher than 55% is necessary to stabilize the debt to GDP ratio in 95 years. 18 
 
To make the situation worse, the Great East Japan Earthquake struck on March 11, 2011.  
A large amount of additional government expenditure will be necessary for reconstruction of the 
affected areas.  The cost for rebuilding the lost infrastructures is estimated to be around 16 to 25 
trillion yen (about 200 or 300 billion dollars at the exchange rate of 80 yen per dollar) by the 
Japanese government.  According to the Basic Principles for Reconstruction that the government 
agreed on July 29, 2011, the government will spend 19 trillion yen in the five years (about $240 
billion or about 4.1% of GDP in 2010).   
How has the disaster and additional expenditures on the recovery efforts changed the 
fiscal sustainability?  For simplicity, let us consider the case when the government immediately 
pays for the total reconstruction expenditure by issuing new bonds.   This is the case when the 
reconstruction expenditure has the maximum impact for the sustainability calculation.   
Following steps similar to the derivation above, one can show that the minimum tax rate 






































  (7) 
where d0 denotes the ratio of the reconstruction expenditure to GDP.  Comparing this to the 















           
  (8) 
Substituting d0 with 4.1% (the amount of reconstruction spending in the next five years 
according to the Basic Principles for Reconstruction), we see the increase in the sustainable tax 19 
 
rate is limited to 0.05 to 0.20 percentage points in the 95 years horizon case.  Thus, although the 
reconstruction cost may be substantial, its impact on the sustainability calculation is minimal 
because the cost can be spread over the long horizon. 
  We can use the equation (8) to examine the impact of a one-time reduction of the 
outstanding debt through outright default or instantaneous inflation.  For example, if we consider 
an extreme case where the value of current debt is cut by half (d0=-76.4%), the sustainable tax 
rate falls by 0.8 to 3.1 percentage points in the 95 years horizon case.  The numbers are larger (in 
absolute term) than the impacts of the reconstruction expenditure, but does not change the fiscal 
sustainability problem very much.  Japan would still need large amount of tax increase to 
stabilize the debt.  This suggests that the problem for Japan mostly comes from the future 
government expenditures and transfers that are expected to far exceed the future tax revenues.  
Although the current level of debt looks enormous, that is only a small part of the much bigger 
problem.  Thus, the reduction of the value of just current debt outstanding does not solve the 
problem by itself. 
 
5.  Does the Japanese Government Increase the Primary Surplus as the Government Debt 
Grows? 
  Will the Japanese government raise the tax rate drastically to stabilize the debt to GDP 
ratio?  One way to answer this question is to examine how the fiscal policy responded to rising 
government debt in the past.  If we observe the tendency for the government to reduce the 
primary deficit sufficiently in response to increasing government debt, for example, we can infer 
that the government may increase the tax rate to stabilize the debt eventually.  Thus, this and the 20 
 
next section examine the Japanese government’s responses to rising government debts in the last 
30 years to see if we are likely to see drastic tax increases in the near future. 
  This section applies the approach proposed by Bohn (1998) that examines the response of 
the primary surplus to the debt.  To illustrate the approach, let xt denote the ratio of primary 
surplus to GDP and suppose it is a linear function of the debt to GDP ratio in the (end of the) 
previous period: 
  11 tt t t t x bxz u         (9) 
where z is a vector of stationary variables that influences the primary surplus and u is a Gaussian 
white noise with variance 
2  .  In contrast to Bohn (1998), we allow the smoothed adjustment of 
primary surplus by including the AR(1) term. 
  In the following analysis, we use two variables for z.  The first is GVAR, which is 
defined to be the temporary deviation from the trend level of government expenditure divided by 
GDP, namely  t t t t Y G G GVAR / ) (
*   , where 
*
t G  is the trend level of government expenditure 
calculated using the method proposed by Hodrick and Prescott (1997).  The budget balance can 
worsen to finance a temporary surge in the government expenditure (such as a war) without 
jeopardizing the long-run sustainability.  Thus, we expect to find the primary surplus respond 
negatively to this variable.  The other stationary variable is GDP gap, which attempts to capture 
the fluctuations of the primary surplus coming from the automatic stabilizer function of the 
government budget.
6  GDP gap is measured as the deviation of the Hodrick-Prescott trend.  The 
primary surplus is likely to fall during economic downturns, so we expect a positive coefficient 
on this variable. 
                                                           
6 Bohn uses the unemployment rate to capture the business cycle fluctuations.  Instead of GDP gap, he uses YVAR 
which  is  defined  as 
* () ( / )
m
tt t t YVAR U U G Y  ,  where  Ut  is th e  unemployment  rate,  U
m  is th e  median 
unemployment rate for the sample.  The choice of the variables follows Barro (1986). 21 
 
  Note that the relation between the primary surplus and debt for a constant interest rate 
and a constant growth rate: 
  1 (1 ) tt t bi b x        (10) 
Substituting (9) into (10) obtains: 
  11 (1 ) tt t t t bi b x z u            (11)  
Noting that  12 1 (1 ) tt t x ibb       : 
  12 (1 ) (1 ) tt t t t bi b i b z u             .  (12) 
Thus,  t b is expressed in the ADF regression form as: 
  11 {( )(1 ) )} (1 ) tt t t t bi b i b z u                  (13) 
Thus, bt is stationary if  () ( 1 ) i     .  Thus, if the primary surplus responds substantially 
positively to an increase in the debt to GDP ratio (assuming that the interest rate is higher than 
the growth rate), the debt to GDP ratio tends to be stabilized in the long run. 
  Intuitively, the debt to GDP ratio grows over time at the rate of the interest rate minus the 
growth rate of GDP even if the primary balance is zero.  In order for this ratio to be stabilized in 
the long run, the primary surplus must be at least as large.  If the primary surplus follows the 
process specified in the equation (9), the long run level of the primary surplus to GDP ratio is 
given by  /( 1 )     times the debt to GDP ratio.  Thus, if  /( 1 )      is greater than the interest 
rate minus the growth rate, the government debt is sustainable. 
  If we allow the response of the primary surplus to the debt to GDP ratio to depend on the 
level of debt to GDP ratio, so that  1 () t f b    , one can show that the debt process is sustainable 
if there exists b* such that  () ( ) ( 1 ) fb i      for all b > b*. 22 
 
  Table 3 reports the estimation result of the equation (9) by maximum likelihood 
estimation (MLE).  The definition of the government sector here is the general government that 
includes the social security funds.  We use the average of the adjusted net debt to GDP ratio for 
the previous four quarters as bt-1.  All other variables are seasonally adjusted using X12-ARIMA, 
if the seasonally adjusted series are not available. The sample period used for this estimation is 
1981Q1 to 2010Q1. 
  The table reports the results for two alternative specifications.  Model 1 is a simple linear 
specification.  Model 2 includes the quadratic term 
2
1 () t bb   , where b is the sample mean of b.  
This is a simple way to introduce the dependence of the size of response (β) on the debt to GDP 
ratio.  In both specifications, the coefficients estimates on GVAR and GDP gap are both 
statistically significant and have the expected signs.  In Model 1, the coefficient estimate on the 
debt to GDP ratio is negative and significant, which implies the process is explosive as long as 
the interest rate exceeds the growth rate. 
  Inclusion of the quadratic term in Model 2 slightly improves the fit of the model. This 
can be seen from the value of Markov switching criterion (MSC) proposed by Smith, Naik, and 
Tsai (2006), which can be used to compare regression models with and without Markov 
switching. The MSC of Model 2 is slightly lower than that of Model 1 but not much. The result 
on the sustainability is the same as that in Model 1.  The coefficient estimates on the linear term 
and the quadratic term of the debt to GDP ratio are both negative, suggesting that the primary 
surplus responds negatively to an increase in the debt to GDP ratio.  Thus, the debt dynamics for 
Japan has been explosive. 23 
 
  The result that the debt dynamics is not sustainable is consistent with what Doi and Ihori 
(2009) found using annual data from 1956 to 2000.
7  The result is not surprising if we look at the 
Figure 12, which plots the primary balance to GDP ratio against the debt to GDP ratio over the 
sample period.  Overall we see the negative relation between primary balance and debt.  But we 
also observe that the primary balance increased as the debt to GDP ratio increased during some 
sub-sample periods.  This suggests the possibility that the debt dynamics was sustainable at least 
in some years. 
  To address this possibility, we estimate the dynamics with possible regime changes.  
Instead of  (9), we consider the specification: 
  t t t t t t t t t t u S z S x S b S S x ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( 1 1             .  (14) 

















whose  ) , ( j i  element indicates the probability that the policy regime moves to Regime i  from 
Regime  j . 
  A natural interpretation of “regimes” would be different fiscal policy stances by different 
administrations.  But, we cannot have the number of regimes as large as the number of distinct 
administration to get statistically reliable estimates.  This is especially so for Japan in the recent 
                                                           
7 Doi and Ihori (2009) follow Bohn (1998) and use the unemployment based measure to account for business cycle 
fluctuations.  When we use the unemployment based measure instead of GDP gap, the result changes in a couple of 
ways.  First, the point estimate of the coefficient on the linear term of debt to GDP ratio becomes positive but it is 
not statistically significant.  Second, the model with the quadratic term shows a  better fit.  The qualitative result, 
however, remains the same.  The debt dynamics is unsustainable at least for the level of debt to GDP ratio as high as 
that in recent years. 24 
 
years when the typical administration lasted only for four quarters (or less).  Thus, this paper 
restricts the number of potential regimes to be two. 
  Table 4 reports the estimation result by the MLE assuming normality.  We again consider 
two alternative specifications: with or without the quadratic term.  The estimation result of 
Model 1 suggests the existence of two regimes with somewhat different responses of the primary 
balance to increasing government debt.  In Regime 1, the coefficient on the debt to GDP ratio is 
negative, suggesting an increase in the debt to GDP ratio leads to a reduction in the primary 
balance.  The reduced primary balance (or the increase in the primary deficit) would increase the 
growth rate of debt.  The situation is clearly unsustainable.  In this regime, the coefficient 
estimate on GDP gap is positive and statistically significant, suggesting strong counter-cyclical 
fluctuations of primary deficit.  The probability that the economy stays in this regime in the next 
period is estimated to be about 0.97.  So the average duration of this regime is more than 8 
years.
8 
  In Regime 2, the coefficient estimate on the debt to GDP ratio is positive, suggesting that 
the dynamics could be sustainable.  The coefficient estimate, however, is small and not 
statistically different from zero.  In this regime, the coefficient on GDP gap is not significantly 
different from zero, suggesting little counter-cyclical fiscal policy.  The probability that the 
economy stays in the regime is 0.96, or the regime continues for about six years and a quarter on 
average. 
  The likelihood for the model with Markov switching is larger than that for the model 
without regime changes.  Indeed, the MSC clearly selects the model with regime changes over 
the model without regime changes. 
                                                           
8 The average duration of Regime i  is given by  ) 1 /( 1 ii p  . See Kim and Nelson (1999, p. 72). 25 
 
  Figure 13 shows the smoothed probability of state being Regime 1 for Model 1.  We can 
see two occasions when the debt dynamics were clearly unsustainable (Regime 1).  One is the 
period from the early 1990s to the early 2000s.  This roughly corresponds to the period often 
referred to as the “lost decade.”  The primary deficit increased, while the debt to GDP ratio rose, 
making the debt dynamics clearly explosive.  The other Regime 1 period is the late 2000s, when 
the budget deficit increased again as a response to the global economic crisis.  In Regime 2, the 
point estimate of the coefficient on the debt to GDP ratio is positive but it is not significantly 
different from zero.  Thus, the debt is not quite sustainable even in this regime, but the dynamics 
is less explosive than Regime 1.  The figure shows Japan was in Regime 2 in the late 1980s.  The 
period is often considered to have been a period of fiscal consolidation, although the model 
suggests that the debt dynamics was explosive even then.  The other Regime 2 period emerged in 
the mid 2000s, which corresponds to the fiscal consolidation attempt under the Koizumi 
government.  
  Model 2 includes the quadratic term in the specification.  Again Regime 1 is a clearly 
unsustainable regime: the budget balance falls as the debt to GDP ratio increases for all the 
possible values of the debt to GDP ratio.  The probability that the economy stays in this regime is 
estimated to be 0.97. In Regime 2, the coefficient on the debt to GDP ratio is positive, so the 
dynamics can be sustainable.  The positive coefficient estimate on the linear term, however, is 
again small and not statistically different from zero.   
  The MSC values suggest that Model 1 with Markov switching is the overall preferred 
model.  The model suggests that the primary surplus did not respond positively to increasing debt 
to GDP ratio in either regime.  Thus, a fiscal policy change that is required to restore fiscal 26 
 
sustainability for the general government sector will have to be an unprecedented change (at least 
in the last 30 years).
9 
  Tables 4 and 5 report the estimation results using the central/local governments as the 
definition of the government sector.  Note that this analysis focuses only on the sustainability of 
the central/local governments, ignoring the social security system which probably has more 
serious sustainability issue.  Thus, the question we ask here is whether the narrowly defined 
government is fiscally sustainable if the issue for the social security system is somehow solved 
separately.  The results are similar to those for the general government sector.  In the model 
without Markov switching (Table 5), the coefficient estimate on the lagged debt to GDP ratio is 
negative and significant.  Thus, the primary surplus increases when the debt to GDP ratio 
increases, making the dynamics explosive.   
  Table 6 shows the estimation results for models with regime changes.  Again the MSC 
selects the models with regime switching over those without regime switching.  Among the 
models with regime switching, the MSC becomes the smallest for the model without the 
quadratic term of the debt to GDP ratio (Model 1).  Similar to the result for the general 
government, the coefficient estimate on the debt to GDP ratio is positive but not statistically 
significant from zero.  Thus, the situation is not sustainable even for the narrowly defined 
government sector.
10 
                                                           
9 When we use the unemployment rate based measure instead of GDP gap to proxy for the business cycle, the model 
with the quadratic term with Markov switching becomes the most preferred model by the MSC.  In Regime 2, the 
policy becomes sustainable for low levels of debt to GDP ratio.  Such sustainable situation, however, did not 
actually happened in the last 30 years because the debt to GDP ratio was already high when the economy was in 
Regime 2 with high probability. 
10 When we use the unemployment based measure of business cycle, the model with the quadratic term and Markov 
switching becomes the most preferred model for the central/local governments.  In Regime 2, the process is found to 
be sustainable for relatively high level of debt to GDP ratio.  Even then, the steady state level of debt to GDP ratio is 
very high, exceeding 140% even in the most favorable case (the interest rate is equal to the growth rate). 27 
 
  In summary, the analysis in this section points to serious problems for the Japan’s 
government debt.  For both the general government sector and the central/local government only, 
the fiscal policy is found to be unsustainable, even when we allow for the possibility of regime 
changes.   
  Ito, Watanabe, and Yabu (2011) estimate a similar model of the debt dynamics with 
possible regime changes.  Looking at a longer sample period (1885-2004), they find the Japanese 
fiscal policy is overall stable.  In the periods 1885-1925 and 1950-1970, the primary surplus 
responded substantially positively to an increase in the debt.  Our result, which comes from the 
analysis of the sample after 1980, is not inconsistent with their finding, because our sample 
period does not contain those years when they find the fiscal policy was sustainable.  We 
interpret their result to imply that the Japanese fiscal policy can be sustainable if Japan can go 
back to the policy regime in 1885-1925 (roughly under the gold standard) and in 1950-1970 
(effective balanced budget legislation) with high probability.  Without such drastic changes, the 
fiscal policy is unsustainable. 
 
6.  Fiscal Sustainability and Monetary Policy 
  The analysis in Section 5 looked at the response of the primary surplus to the debt.  Thus, 
it was not clear whether the tax revenue or the government expenditure changes responding to 
the changes in the level of government debt.  This section focuses on the adjustment of the tax 
revenue side and investigates if the tax revenue has shown the tendency to increase as the debt 
increases given the government expenditure.   
  We examine how the tax revenue responds to the debt to GDP ratio by estimating a 
Markov switching model used by Davig and Leeper (2007).  They specify the fiscal policy 28 
 
function in terms of the tax revenue to GDP ratio as a function of the debt to GDP ratio, output 
gap, and government purchases: 
  1 () () () () () tt t t y t t g t tt t S S b S gap S g S u             (15) 
where gapt stands for the output gap.  We calculate the output gap as the deviation of GDP from 
its Hodrick-Prescott trend. 
  Table 7 shows the estimation results of the fiscal policy function (15) for the general 
government sector by the MLE assuming normality.  Two regimes are identified.  In Regime 1, 
the coefficient estimate on the debt to GDP ratio is negative, suggesting the tax revenue falls 
when the debt to GDP ratio increases.  The smoothed probability of Regime 1 is shown in Figure 
14.  According to the terminology originally developed by Leeper (1991), an “active” policy is 
not constrained by the level of government debt.  The fiscal policy in Regime 1 is “active” in this 
sense.  In contrast, a “passive” policy responds prudently to shocks to the government debt.  For 
the U.S. data, Davig and Leeper (2007) find the fiscal policy alternates between the “active” 
phase and the “passive” phase that is characterized by a positive coefficient on the debt to GDP 
ratio.  For the general government sector of Japan, we find the coefficient on the debt to GDP 
ratio in Regime 2 to be zero.  
  Thus, regardless the state, the tax revenue fails to increase when the debt to GDP ratio 
rises.  In both regimes, the tax revenue increases when the government expenditure increases but 
by much less than one-to-one.  The fiscal dynamics for Japan does not show the tax adjustment 
to make the fiscal policy sustainable.  
  Table 8 shows the estimation result for the central/local governments.  The result is 
qualitatively the same as that in Table 7.  In Regime 1, the fiscal policy is active, with tax 29 
 
revenues responding negatively to increases in the debt to GDP ratio.  In Regime 2, the 
coefficient estimate on the debt to GDP ratio is zero. 
  An active fiscal policy is not necessarily unsustainable.  As Davig and Leeper (2011) and 
others show, an active fiscal policy can be sustainable if the monetary authority acts “passively” 
and allows the price level to adjust eventually to make the value of the government bonds 
outstanding equal to the present discount value of future expected primary surpluses.  Because 
the Japanese fiscal policy has looked active in the last 30 years both at the level of the general 
government sector and at the level of the central/local governments, it is important to check how 
the monetary policy has been conducted.
11 
  To check this, we estimate the following monetary policy function, which is potentially 
state dependent.   
  () () () () ()
MM M M M
tM t M t t y t t e tt t t rS S S gap S ex S v         ,  (16) 
where rt is the nominal interest rate, πt is the inflation rate, gapt is the GDP gap and ext is the 
deviation of the real exchange rate from its trend. The trend GDP and the trend real exchange 
rate are the HP trend of each series.  
M
t S  is the monetary policy regime that evolves according to 
a Markov chain. 
  Table 9 reports the estimation results.  Column 1 reports the estimated coefficients from 
the model without regime switches.  The estimated coefficient on the inflation rate is much 
greater than one, suggesting an active monetary policy to maintain a targeted inflation rate.  
When the actual inflation rate goes up above the target rate, the central bank raises the interest 
                                                           
11 The literature on “active” versus “passive” policies so far has not considered the implications of the zero bound 
for the nominal interest rate, which could be important for the Japanese case.  Takeda (2002) was probably the first 
paper to discuss the implications of “active” and “passive” fiscal policies using the data from Japan.  Using the data 
from an earlier period (1970-1990) and slightly different specifications, he finds both fiscal and monetary policies 
are  “passive.”   If  both  policies  are passi ve,  the  price  level  is in determinate.   He in terprets  this  to  imply  the 
passiveness of the policies allow the deflation in Japan and suggests a (temporarily) active fiscal policy to be a 
solution to end the deflation.  30 
 
rate by more than one to one, raising the real interest rate.  Such monetary policy eventually 
brings the inflation rate back to the target level.  Thus, the model that ignores the possibility of 
regime changes for the monetary policy suggest that the monetary policy in Japan has been 
“active” in the sense that the central bank reacted strongly to deviations of the inflation rate from 
its target level.  The combination of active fiscal policy and active monetary policy is 
unsustainable.  This combination cannot continue forever.  Eventually, either the fiscal authority 
or the monetary authority is forced to be inactive and accommodate the other.   
  The coefficients on the variables other than the inflation rate are not precisely estimated 
in the model without regimes changes, although the point estimates have the expected signs.  
When the output falls below the trend (gap variable is negative), the monetary policy becomes 
more expansionary (lower interest rate). When the real exchange rate appreciate above the trend 
(ex variable is positive), the monetary policy becomes expansionary. 
  The result for active monetary policy disappears when we estimate a model with regime 
switches.  The last two columns of Table 9 report the result for the Markov switching model.  
The MSC suggests that the model with regime switches is much more preferred to the one 
without.  The coefficient on the inflation rate is less than one in both regimes, suggesting the 
monetary policy is inactive.  Regime 1 is relatively more active but the coefficient estimate is 
still less than one.  The response to the output gap in Regime 1 is large but not precisely 
estimated.  The response to the exchange rate is significantly different from zero. 
  Regime 2 shows the smaller response of the interest rate to all the variables, but each 
coefficient estimate is statistically significantly different from zero.  Regime 2 also shows low 
volatility of the interest rate. 31 
 
  Figure 15 shows the smoothed probability of Regime 1.  Regime 1 lasted for the first 15 
years of the sample.  From the third quarter of 1995 (note this is when the Bank of Japan lowered 
the target rate to 0.5%) to the fourth quarter of 1995, the monetary policy quickly moved to 
Regime 2, which has been continuing for the next 15 years. 
  Given this result, we suspect that the result for active monetary policy in the model 
without regime switches came mostly from the comparison between the period before 1995 (high 
inflation rate and high interest rate) and the period after 1995 (low inflation rate and low interest 
rate).  Within each regime, the interest rate never responded to the inflation rate by more than 
one for one. 
  The analysis of this section finds fluctuations of regimes of fiscal policy and monetary 
policy.  Unlike the results for the U.S. found by Davig and Leeper (2007), we do not find the 
policies fluctuate between active and inactive regimes.  For the fiscal policy, both regimes are 
active.  The result does not change when we examine only the central/local governments 
ignoring the solvency of the social security system.  For the monetary policy, both regimes are 
inactive.  Thus, this section’s analysis suggests that the active fiscal policy has been supported by 
inactive monetary policy in Japan for the last 30 years.  If this pattern persists, the most likely 
scenario for the future reconciliation of the mounting government debt may be the reduction of 
the value of government debt through inflation under accommodative monetary policy, however 
unlikely it seems in the current deflationary environment. 
 
7.  Conclusions 
  In this paper, we have examined the fiscal sustainability of Japan using three alternative 
but complementary approaches and for two alternative definitions of the government sector.  All 32 
 
the results point to the same conclusion: the Japanese government debt poses serious challenges.  
To stabilize the debt to GDP ratio, Japan needs to implement a tax rate hike with an 
extraordinary magnitude.  Such tax increase to make the fiscal policy sustainable would 
represent a drastic departure from the Japanese fiscal policy in the last 30 years.  The fiscal 
policy in Japan is found to be unsustainable even when we allow the possibility of regime 
changes.  If the government fails to reduce the primary deficit by increasing the taxes and 
reducing the expenditures and transfer payments, Japan would be forced to reduce the value of 
government debt through either inflation or outright default.     33 
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Table 1. Calculation of Quarterly Data by Sub-Sector 
Transactions  Central and local 
governments 
Social security funds 
Income and Outlay Accounts    
 1. Taxes on production and imports ,receivable     
    (1) Taxes on products     
         a.  Value added type taxes (VAT)  I  0 
         b.  Import duties  I  0 
         c.  Others  I  0 
    (2) Other taxes on production  I  0 
 2. (less) Subsidies ,payable  I  0 
 3. Property income ,receivable      
    (1) Interest  IV  II 
    (2) Distributed income of corporations     
         a.  Dividends  I  0 
         b.  Withdrawals from income of quasi-corporations  IV  III 
    (3) Property income attributed to insurance policy holders  I  0 
    (4) Rent  IV  III 
 5. Property income, payable      
    (1) Interest  IV  II 
    (2) Rent  I  0 
 8. Current taxes on income, wealth, etc., receivable      
    (1) Taxes on income  I  0 
    (2) Other current taxes  I  0 
 9. Social contributions, receivable      
    (1) Actual social contributions     
         a.  Compulsory employers' actual social contributions  0  I 
         b.  Compulsory employees' social contributions  0  I 
    (2) Imputed social contributions  Same as 12(2) by 
definition 
Same as 12(2) by 
definition 
10. Other current transfers, receivable     
    (1) Non-life insurance claims  IV  III 
    (2) Current transfers within general government     
         a.  From central government  V  IV 
         b.  From local government  V  IV 
         c.  From social security funds  V  N/A 
    (3) Current international cooperation  I  0 
    (4) Miscellaneous current transfers  IV  II 
12. Social benefits other than social transfers in kind ,payable     
    (1) Social security benefits in cash  0  I 
    (2) Unfunded employee social benefits  IV  II 
    (3) Social assistance benefits  I  0 
13. Other current transfers ,payable     
    (1) Net non-life insurance premiums  IV  III 36 
 
    (2) Current transfers within general government     
         a.  To central government  Same as 10(2)b  A part of 10(2)c 
         b.  To local government  Same as 10(2)a  A part of 10(2)c 
         c.  To social security funds  Same as 10(2)a & b  N/A 
    (3) Current international cooperation  I  0 
    (4) Miscellaneous current transfers  IV  II 
17. Final consumption expenditure  IV  II 
Capital Finance Accounts    
19. Capital transfers, receivable     
    (1) From other sub-sectors of general government  Same as 10(2)  Same as 10(2) 
    (2) From residents     
         a.  Of which capital taxes  I  0 
         b.  Of which special factors  I’  I’ 
         c.  Other items  IV  III 
    (3) From the rest of the world  I  0 
20. (less) Capital transfers, payable     
    (1) To other sub-sectors of general government  Same as 13(2)  Same as 13(2) 
    (2) To residents     
         a.  Of which special factors  I  0 
         b.  Other items  IV  III 
    (3) To the rest of the world  I  0 
22. Gross fixed capital formation  IV  II 
23. (less) Consumption of fixed capital  IV  II 
24. Changes in inventories  IV  III 
25. Purchases of land, net     
         a.  Of which special factors  I  0 
         b.  Other items  IV  III 




Notes: The item numbers correspond to those used by the official reports of national income accounting.   
The letter in each cell shows how the item for the subsector is estimated. 
0. The amount is zero. 
I. Same as the amount for the entire general government 
I’. Same as the amount for the entire general government if the special factor for the quarter applies to the 
subsector. 
II. Calculated so that the proportion of the social security account in each quarter is the same as the 
proportion of annual amounts for the year. 
III. Calculated by dividing the annual amounts by four. 
IV. Subtracting the amount for the social security account from the amount for the whole general 
government sector 
V. Estimated from the Ministry of Finance "Receipts and Payments of Treasury Funds with the Private 
Sector" and the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications "White Paper on Local Public Finance" is 
adopted. 
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Table 2. Simulation Results of Government Revenue-GDP Ratio Required for Fiscal 
Sustainability 
Panel A.  95 years horizon,  (nominal growth rate) = 2% 




Rate Gap  
(interest rate) 
Case 2  Case 3 
0% (2%)  39.9%  38.8%  38.9% 32.3%  44.9%  37.2% 
1% (3%)  41.8%  40.9%  41.0% 33.7%  44.4%  38.8% 
2% (4%)  44.1%  43.4%  43.5% 34.9%  43.9%  40.8% 
3% (5%)  45.2%  44.6%  44.7% 36.0%  43.3%  41.7% 
4% (6%)  46.7%  46.4%  46.5% 36.9%  42.9%  43.1% 
n  95 95 95 98 98  90 
         
Panel B: 38 years horizon,  (nominal growth rate) = 2% 
 
Case 1  Case 2 Case 3
Broda and 
Weinstein (2005)
Rate Gap  
(interest rate) 
Case 2  Case 3
0% (2%)  41.1%  40.9% 41.0% 35.3%  40.2% 
1% (3%)  42.5%  42.4% 42.5% 35.9%  40.4% 
2% (4%)  44.7%  44.6% 44.7% 36.5%  40.6% 
3% (5%)  45.4%  45.3% 45.4% 37.0%  40.8% 
4% (6%)  46.8%  46.8% 46.9% 37.6%  41.0% 
n  38 38 38  38  38 
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Table 3. Estimation Results of the Debt Dynamics for General Government Sector 
Explanatory 
variable  Model 1  Model 2 





























Log-likelihood  523.10  524.85 
MSC  -916.4  -917.7 
 
Notes: Estimated by the MLE assuming the error term are normally distributed with mean 0 and 
variance 
2  .  The dependent variable is the prim ary balance divided by GDP.  Num bers in the 
parentheses are standard errors.  GVAR is the deviation of the government expenditure from  its 
trend divided by GDP. GDP gap is measured as the deviation from the Hodrick-Prescott trend.  ρ 
is the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable.  MSC reports the value of Markov switching 
criteria proposed by Smith, Naik, and Tsai (2006). 
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Table 4. Models with Markov Switching for General Government Sector 
  Model 1  Model 2 


































































Log-likelihood  563.9  564.1 
MSC  -955.1  -942.8 
Without 
switching  -916.4  -917.7 
 
Notes:  Estimated  by the MLE assum ing  normality.   The dependent variable is the prim ary 
balance divided by GDP.  Numbers in the parentheses are standard errors.   bt-1 is the average of 
the debt to GDP ratios f or the last four quarters, and  b is its average over the sample period.  
GVAR is the deviation of the government expenditure from its trend divided by GDP. GDP ga p 
is measured as the deviation from  the Hodrick-Prescott trend. ρ is the coefficient on the lagged 
dependent variable.  MSC repor ts the value of Markov sw itching criteria proposed by Sm ith, 
Naik, and Tsai (2006). 
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Table 5. Estimation Results of the Debt Dynamics for Central/Local Governments 
Explanatory 
variable  Model 1  Model 2 































Log-likelihood  533.40   520.59  
MSC  -937.0  -934.8 
 
Notes: Estimated by the MLE assuming the error term are normally distributed with mean 0 and 
variance 
2  .  The dependent variable is the prim ary balance divided by GDP.  Num bers in the 
parentheses are standard errors.  GVAR is the deviation of the government expenditure from  its 
trend divided by GDP. GDP gap is measured as the deviation from the Hodrick-Prescott trend.  ρ 
is the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable.  MSC reports the value of Markov switching 
criteria proposed by Smith, Naik, and Tsai (2006). 
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Table 6. Models with Markov Switching for Central/Local Governments 
  Model 1  Model 2 




































































Log-likelihood  569.2  566.9 
MSC  -966.0  -953.1 
Without 
switching  -937.0  -934.8 
 
Notes:  Estimated  by the MLE assum ing  normality.   The dependent variable is the prim ary 
balance divided by GDP.  Numbers in the parentheses are standard errors.   bt-1 is the average of 
the debt to GDP ratios f or the last four quarters, and  b is its average over the sample period.  
GVAR is the deviation of the government expenditure from its trend divided by GDP. GDP ga p 
is measured as the deviation from the Hodrick-Prescott trend.   ρ is the coefficient on the lagged 
dependent variable.  MSC repor ts the value of Markov sw itching criteria proposed by Sm ith, 
Naik, and Tsai (2006). 
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Table 7. Estimation Results of the Fiscal Policy Function for General Government Sector 
  Regime 1  Regime 2 


























Log-likelihood  549.4 
MSC  -948.3 
Without switching  -915.6 
 
Notes: Estimated by the MLE assum ing normality.  The dependent variable is the tax revenue 
divided by GDP.  Numbers in the parentheses are standard errors.  The lagged debt to GDP ratio 
is the average of the debt to GDP ratios for the previous four quarters.  GDP gap is m easured as 
the deviation from the Hodrick-Prescott tre nd.  MSC reports the value of Markov switching 
criteria proposed by Smith, Naik, and Tsai (2006). 
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Table 8. Estimation Results of the Fiscal Policy Function for Central/Local Governments 
  Regime 1  Regime 2 



























Log-likelihood  562.3 
MSC  -974.9 
Without switching  -928.9 
 
Notes: Estimated by the MLE assuming normality.  The dependent variable is the tax revenue 
divided by GDP.  Numbers in the parentheses are standard errors.  The lagged debt to GDP ratio 
is the average of the debt to GDP ratios for the previous four quarters.  GDP gap is measured as 
the deviation from the Hodrick-Prescott trend.  MSC reports the value of Markov switching 
criteria proposed by Smith, Naik, and Tsai (2006). 
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Model with switching 
    Regime 1  Regime 2 






































Log-likelihood  -194.16  -49.58 
MSC  515.861  259.585 
 
Notes: Estimated by the MLE assuming the error term are normally distributed with mean 0 and 
variance 
2  .   The dependent vari able  is the average overnig ht  call  rate.   Num bers  in the 
parentheses are standard errors.   gap is the GDP gap, which  is measured as the deviation from 
the  Hodrick-Prescott trend.   ex  is the deviatio n  of  the real ef fective  exchange r ate  from  its 
Hodrick-Prescott trend.  MSC reports the value of Markov switching criteria proposed by Smith, 
Naik, and Tsai (2006). 
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Figure 5. Gross Debt, Net Debt, and Adjusted Net Debt for General Government Sector (4 
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Figure 6. Gross Debt, Net Debt, and Adjusted Net Debt for Central/Local Governments (4 
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Figure 11. Adjusted Net Debt to GDP Ratio under Each Scenario 
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